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Summary. Privacy is a prime concern in today’s information society. To protect
the privacy of individuals, enterprises must follow certain privacy practices, while
collecting or processing personal data. In this chapter we look at the setting where an
enterprise collects private data on its website, processes it inside the enterprise and
shares it with partner enterprises. In particular, we analyse three different privacy
systems that can be used in the different stages of this lifecycle. One of them is the
Audit Logic, recently introduced, which can be used to keep data private when it
travels across enterprise boundaries. We conclude with an analysis of the features
and shortcomings of these systems.
1 Introduction
The last decades, people have started to use network services in their everyday
lives. For example, in most countries there is now a widespread use of internet
services, such as online stores, online forums etcetera. To be able to use these
services, users often have to reveal privacy sensitive data to the enterprise
operating the services. This data is often needed to provide (a better) service
or for other purposes; however, once the private data has been disclosed, the
enterprise could also misuse it, e.g. by trading it to marketing agencies. To
prevent this, nowadays there exist laws demanding the enterprises to comply
with precise privacy practices [1, 2].
For instance, the European Union in 1995 issued a directive to its member
states that regulates the collection, storage and processing of personal data [1].
In 2002 this directive was extended to adapt to the ongoing changes in the
electronic communications sector [2]. With these directives, the EU affirms the
importance of privacy and the importance of aligning the privacy laws of the
different EU member states, as exchanging private data across borders would
be problematic, if countries had different privacy laws [2]. Among other things,
the directives demand that enterprises only collect private data for specified,
explicit and legitimate purposes and that the data may not be processed in
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ways incompatible with those purposes [1]. To see an example of how the EU
directives translate to requirements for computer systems, consider the setting
of an online store. On the checkout page, the store requests the credit card
number and the home address of users making a purchase. In addition, it asks
users if their address can be given to partners, for the purpose of promotional
mailings. For instance, the store sells airplane tickets, while the partners of-
fer hotel rooms and cars for rental. The first requirement, that follows from
the directive, is that the checkout page contains explicit statements about
the purposes for which the credit card data and the home address data are
collected. The second requirement is that the enterprise’s web server, other
systems in the backend and systems at the partner sites, must not process the
data for purposes other than those stated on the checkout page.
In this setting, the lifecycle of the private data consists of three stages: The
first stage is the moment of collection by the enterprise. The second stage is
the processing inside the enterprise, while the third stage is the processing
outside the enterprise, at the partner sites. In this chapter we illustrate three
(complementary) privacy systems, each of which can be used in one of the
these stages: Surveys [3] show that, for websites, P3P [4] is the most widely
used system for the expression of the purposes for which private data is col-
lected. Therefore, in Section 2, we analyse P3P and we give an example of
how it is used in practice. Secondly, in Section 3, we analyse E-P3P [5]. E-P3P
is basically the only system which was designed precisely to address the prob-
lem of ensuring that inside the enterprise private data is used for the right
purposes (see for related work Section 5). Finally, in Section 4 we analyse the
Audit Logic, a system introduced by recently [6], that can be used for the
protection of private data across enterprise boundaries.
2 Privacy Statements
Web sites often ask users to disclose their private data, like name, address,
email address etcetera; this information may be needed by the webservice
to provide a better service, though it could also be used for other unwanted
purposes. This raises the need to inform the user about how his personal
data is being treated: e.g. who will see it, for how long it will be stored,
and for which purposes it is going to be used. Actually, in many countries,
websites have to provide a privacy statement explaining how personal data is
used [1, 7].
However, privacy statements are often too long and detailed to be under-
stood by the ordinary internet user. P3P - which was introduced in 1997 by
the W3C, but only became an official recommendation in 2002 - is devised
to solve this problem by supporting automatic analysis of privacy statements.
P3P is now used by many popular websites [3].
P3P allows enterprises to translate their privacy statements into a stan-
dardized XML-based format, using a common vocabulary, to be placed on
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their websites [4]. When a website supports P3P, a visitor can employ an au-
tomatic tool to analyze the website’s privacy statement and quickly decide if
they are satisfactory.
To illustrate how it works, let us see an example.
Example 1. Claudia visits an online store and after choosing a product she
goes to the checkout page. Here she fills out a form with some private data:
i.e. her name and credit card number. The store states in a privacy statement
that it will use this data only to complete the transaction. In addition, the
checkout form has a non-obligatory field for the customers email address. The
store states (in a second privacy statement) that this information will be used
for promotional mailings. Both privacy statements can be translated in P3P.
The resulting policy is shown in Figure 1.
<POLICIES xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/P3Pv1">
<POLICY name="checkout"
entity="Store, 5th Avenue, Manhattan, PO 10001, USA">
<DISPUTES>service="PrivacySeal.orG/DisputeResolution"</DISPUTES>
<ACCESS><none/></ACCESS>
<STATEMENT>
<PURPOSE><current/></PURPOSE>
<RECIPIENT><ours/></RECIPIENT>
<RETENTION><stated-purpose/></RETENTION>
<DATA-GROUP>
<DATA ref="#user.name"/>
<DATA ref="#dynamic.miscdata"/></DATA-GROUP>
</STATEMENT>
<STATEMENT>
<PURPOSE><contact required="opt-in"/></PURPOSE>
<RECIPIENT><ours/></RECIPIENT>
<RETENTION><stated-purpose/></RETENTION>
<DATA-GROUP>
<DATA ref="#online.email"/></DATA></DATA-GROUP>
</STATEMENT></POLICY></POLICIES>
Fig. 1. A sample P3P policy
This allows us to see the elements of a P3P policy: In the first place,
the entity indicates the issuer of the policy. Secondly, the disputes element
describes how possible conflicts over the privacy policy may be resolved (e.g.,
by which court, or other entity). This is not binding, in the sense that the
enterprise is still subject to the legal ways to resolving a privacy dispute. The
access element indicates whether the submitted data may be accessed by the
subject after it has been collected. This can be used for instance to verify the
accuracy of the collected data. This policy states that access is not possible.
Finally, the key elements of the P3P policy are the statements which describe,
4 M.A.C. Dekker, S. Etalle, and J. den Hartog
per data item, for which purpose it is collected, who is allowed to access it
(in the recipient element) and for how long it will be stored (in the retention
element). In the figure the purposes are respectively current, which refers to
the online purchase and contact, which indicates that the information can be
used to contact the user for “marketing of services or products”. The purpose
element may also contain an attribute indicating how a user can express his
consent to the purpose. In this case, explicit opt-in is required for the purpose
contact. The recipient value ours means that the data can only be accessed
by the store (e.g. it will not be given to third parties), while the retention
value stated-purpose means that the data will only be retained for a period
needed for the stated purpose. The data element is specified by a reference to
an element in a so-called P3P data schema, e.g. #online.email. The data-
schema defines the format and the meaning of the data-elements that may
occur in a P3P policy. In the example, by not specifying a data-schema, we
use P3P’s default data-schema.
Going back to our example, if Claudia’s browser supports P3P, it can
compare the above policy with Claudia’s privacy preferences. One of these
preferences states that she wants to be warned when sites request information
for purposes other than current. In this case the browser, can notify her that
she may or may not supply her email address for marketing of services or
products. Her advantage is that she does not have to read the site’s privacy
statement to find out what they mean and which fields are optional.
Since its introduction in 1997, P3P has received considerable attention [7].
Its deployment was particularly stimulated by the introduction in 2001 of a
privacy slider in Microsoft’s Internet Explorer 6. This privacy slider allows
the user to determine which websites may set and retrieve cookies, according
to their P3P policies. Cookies from websites with no P3P policies (or with an
unsatisfactory one) are blocked by the browser.
A drawback of P3P is that, despite its simplicity, P3P policies can be am-
biguous [8]. For instance, one could refer to the same data element twice with
different retention periods, within the same policy. Ambiguities may result in
legal risks for the issuers as their policies may be interpreted in unexpected
ways [9]. This also makes the development of P3P compliant browsers more
difficult. As a matter of fact, despite the fact that P3P was designed to be in-
terpreted by browsers, there is no definition of how a browser should interpret
policies, and there are no guidelines for writing ’browser-friendly’ policies [9].
Finally, we should mention that while P3P addresses the problem of repre-
senting a website’s privacy policy, it does not address the problem of enforcing
them. The use of P3P alone does not give assurance about the actual privacy
practices in the backend of the website. Critics have even suggested that the
online industry, by adopting P3P, is only giving an appearance of protecting
privacy, to avoid stricter legislation [10].
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3 Enterprise Privacy
As mentioned earlier, in many countries, legislation regulates the collection
and the use of private data. This requires enterprises to enforce privacy poli-
cies that prescribe for example when certain data should be deleted, by whom
it may be accessed and for which purposes. As we saw in the previous section,
P3P can be used to represent such privacy policies on websites, but it does
not address the problem of enforcing them inside the enterprise. The Platform
for Enterprise Privacy Practices (E-P3P) - introduced in 2002 by Karjoth et
al. - addresses exactly this problem [5]. E-P3P provides an XML-based lan-
guage to express privacy policies as well as a framework with specific privacy
functionality to enforce these policies. Before giving a practical example of
how E-P3P works, we give an overview of the main components of the E-P3P
system.
In the E-P3P architecture an enterprise collects private data at so-called
collection points. Here individuals, e.g. customers, submit private data to the
enterprise, after agreeing with the enterprise’s privacy statements. Each col-
lection point has a form which associates the private data with its subject,
declares its type, e.g. medical record or postal address, and the subject’s con-
sent choices. This association remains intact in the enterprise’s backend and
it may even travel to another enterprise. In E-P3P this is called the sticky
policy paradigm [5]. The sticky policy does not refer to enterprise policies
but refers to the privacy statements and the filled in consent choices on the
data-collection form that stick to the private data.
The privacy officer of the enterprise declares, by using E-P3P’s policy
language, the privacy policies by specifying who can access which type of
data for which purposes. The privacy policy can also refer to the subject’s
consent choices and to certain privacy obligations, e.g. delete the data in 30
days. Operations in the enterprise’s legacy applications are then mapped to
terminology used in the privacy policies, and, in the reverse direction, privacy
obligations used in the privacy policies are mapped to operations in the legacy
applications. For example, the ’send’ operation of a mass-mailer system, used
in the marketing department, is mapped to the term read for the purpose
of marketing in the privacy policy. Conversely, the term delete the subject’s
email in the privacy policy is implemented as an ’unsubscribe’ operation of a
mailing list system.
Finally, access to the private data of a subject is granted in two steps. The
access to the legacy enterprise application is evaluated by an access control
system, for instance taking into account employee roles, which is independent
of the E-P3P system. Then, the legacy application makes an access request
to a privacy enforcement system for the subject’s private data. The privacy
enforcement system decides wether access should be granted, by evaluating
the enterprise policy and by matching against the subject’s consent choices. If
access is granted, then the privacy enforcement system also executes possible
privacy obligations specified in the enterprise policy.
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Example 2. Consider the previous example of an online store collecting private
data on its checkout page. The enterprise that owns the online store wants
customers to trust its privacy practices. To this end, it has published privacy
statements on the checkout page and uses E-P3P to ensure that enterprise
systems behave according to them.
These privacy statements specify that Claudia’s name and credit card
number may be accessed by the employees from the Billing department pro-
vided that the purpose is ’billing’ and that the data is subsequently deleted. In
addition, employees may use Claudia’s email address for marketing purposes,
if Claudia opted in to this purpose. The corresponding E-P3P policy is shown
in Figure 2.
<ep3pPolicy
version = ’1.2’
issuer = ’Store’
vocabulary-ref = ’http://www.Store.com/Voc’
default-ruling=’deny’>
<rule>
<dataCategory>allData.creditCardData</dataCategory>
<purpose>business.billing</purpose>
<userCategory>employees.billing</userCategory>
<ruling>ALLOW</ruling>
<action>read</action>
<obligation action=deleteWithIn(30)</obligation></rule>
<condition/>
<rule>
<dataCategory>allData.contactData</dataCategory>
<purpose>business.marketing</purpose>
<userCategory>employees</userCategory>
<ruling>ALLOW</ruling>
<action>read</action>
<obligation\>
<condition>OptInToMarketing=True</condition>
</ruleset>
</ep3pPolicy>
Fig. 2. A sample E-P3P policy
Now suppose that an employee of the marketing department wants to send
an email with promotions to a number of customers (including Claudia), by
using a mass-mailing system. The mass-mailing system, after checking that
the employee is authorized to use the system, sends a request to the E-P3P
privacy enforcement system to see whether access should be allowed on the
basis of the enterprise’s privacy policy. The request has the following form:
<ep3pQuery>
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<userCategory>employees</userCategory>
<dataCategory>allData.contactData</dataCategory>
<purpose>business.marketing</purpose>
<action>Read</action>
</ep3pQuery>
The request is matched against the E-P3P policy by the policy enforcement
engine. The policy prescribes to check wether Claudia gave consent to re-
ceiving promotional mailings, in which case the privacy enforcement system
grants the request, allow, otherwise, it will reject the request deny, which is
also the default value.
This example shows the key elements of an E-P3P policy: a reference to
the vocabulary used, the policy’s default-ruling and the policy’s ruleset. The
ruleset is a list of E-P3P rules that declares which user categories can perform
which actions on which data categories and for which purposes. The vocab-
ulary allows one to define hierarchies of data categories, purposes, and data
users, which are convenient to refine a privacy policy in a hierarchical sense.
For example, the allow ruling inherits downwards in the hierarchies: When a
rule allows a request for ’allData’, then a request for ’allData.creditCardData’
is also allowed. Denials, on the other hand, are inherited both downward and
upward, for example if a rule denies access to allData.creditCardData, then
the requests for allData or allData.creditCardData.cardType are also denied.
E-P3P is introduced by Karjoth et al. [5], while the full XML-based lan-
guage and semantics for E-P3P policies was defined by Ashley et al. [11].
EPAL [12], a language very similar to (and derived from) E-P3P, was sub-
mitted by IBM to the W3C for standardization, but at the time of writing it
has not been endorsed. IBM has also implemented EPAL in the IBM Tivoli
Privacy Manager, a system delivering automatic management of private data
to bring down the enterprise’s costs of privacy management and to decrease
the risks of unauthorized disclosures.
As we mentioned, E-P3P also allows data to be moved from one enterprise
to another, together with the form that was used to collect it; the sticky policy
paradigm. This way, the destination enterprise receives private data with a
privacy policy, the enforcement of which might require the composition of
policies or checking that one policy is a refinement of the other. The precise
definition of the composition and refinement operations for E-P3P policies is
given by Backes et al. [13].
It is worth remarking that, although the names of E-P3P and P3P are
very similar, they are used in different settings. One is used to manage pri-
vacy rules internal to an enterprise, the other is used to communicate, in a
standardized way, privacy policies to internet users. To link these two aspects,
Karjoth et al. [14] propose to generate and publish P3P policies directly from
internal enterprise privacy policies and to update them regularly to reflect the
enterprise’s current practices. Yu et al. [8] on the other hand argue that P3P
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policies should be more long-term promises, which should not change each
time an internal business rule is updated.
4 Audit Logic
Where P3P and E-P3P offer methods for specifying privacy policies and en-
forcing these policies within an organization, the issue of how to protect pri-
vacy when data can be modified and/or travels across different companies
remains open. In this section we describe the Audit Logic [6], which provides
an alternative approach to privacy protection. The Audit Logic addresses the
issue of compliance to policies for data which moves across different security
domains.
Example 3. Company A and B are member of a federation that shares cus-
tomer contact information for the purpose of marketing. The federation rules
require that the companies build audit trails for their commercial mailings,
which may be checked by an independent authority.
When company A collects information from clients it also asks for per-
mission to provide this information to its partners, e.g. through a Do you
want to receive offers from our partners? -checkbox on a webform. When this
box is selected the email address is shared with company B, which is given
permission to send one email a month regarding its offers.
After the contact information is provided to company B, company A can
no longer control the use of this data; even if both company A and B are
using P3P and/or E-P3P, A cannot ensure that the data is used according to
its privacy policy. A method is needed which will allow company A to place a
privacy policy on the data it provides to company B and will give A confidence
that this policy will be adhered to.
When data leaves the security domain, Access Control [15, 16, 17] is not
sufficient for protecting the data; as the control over the access moves with
the data. Digital rights management (DRM) techniques [18, 19] on the other
hand are designed to ensure policy compliance for data which moves across
security domains. Licenses and keys are needed to access the data and de-
scribe the policies for this data. While the data centric approach of licenses
is useable for providing the privacy policies, DRM techniques are often not
flexible enough or have requirements, such as the need for special (trusted)
hardware, which are not realistic in our corporate collaboration scenario. For
a privacy protection mechanism to be viable it should not unduly increase the
costs or required effort for the companies involved.
The Audit Logic applies data centric techniques in an auditing approach
where compliance to policies is not enforced a-priori but instead actions of
the users may need to be justified a-posteriori, i.e. users may be audited.
By holding the users accountable for their actions, the Audit Logic approach
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tries to deter rather than prevent policy violation. By using this approach
the Audit Logic formalizes the audit trail which is already present in many
companies and enables its use for privacy protection. In some cases it may
be needed to protect the audit trail, for instance by using techniques from
tamper-proof logging [20].
4.1 The Audit Logic Framework
The Audit Logic framework consists of agents executing actions, optionally
logging these actions and being audited to check if their actions adhered to
the relevant (privacy) policies. Actions can be e.g. sending an email to an
address, reading and updating information in a medical file, but also providing
a new policy to another agent. Figure 3 shows an example execution in the
framework: In the first step (I), agent a provides a policy φ to agent b which
b records in his log (II). Next (III) agent b reads document d which is stored
in the company database. At a later point the auditing authority, which is
checking access to privacy sensitive files, finds the access of b (IV) and requests
b to justify this access (V). In response, b shows that the access was allowed
according to the policy φ which was provided by a. The auditor, initially
unaware of a’s involvement, can now (VI) audit a for having provided the
policy φ to b.
Fig. 3. Sample deployment depicting actions, the logging and interaction with an
auditor.
The policy language
As illustrated by the example, policies needs to be able express permissions
to execute actions. For example a policy may be mayRead(b, d) expressing the
permission to execute the action read(b, d). Besides expressing basic facts
10 M.A.C. Dekker, S. Etalle, and J. den Hartog
and permissions, the policy language of the audit logic allows combination
of permissions and adding requirements or obligations: e.g. mayRead(b, d) ∧
mayWrite(b, d) expresses that b may both access and update document d and
isSysAdmin(b) → mayWrite(b, d) expresses that b may update document d
provided he is a system administrator.
The constructions mentioned above provide an expressive language for
writing privacy policies for a given agent. To enable agents to provide per-
missions to other agents, an additional construct “says to” is provided: This
construct is used to describe delegation rights: e.g. a says mayRead(b, d) to b
expresses that a is allowed to give the policy mayRead(b, d) to b.
Logged actions
When b receives the policy from a, b decides to store this policy in his log.
The log is assumed to be secure and only able to store actions that actually
happened and only when they happen. For the sending of policies this reflects
the assumption that communications are non-refutable; b will be able to prove
that a sent the policy.
Deriving permissions
When an agent wants to execute an action, the decision has to be made
whether the policies allow this action. The policy framework uses a logical
derivation system to decide whether a given set of policies, facts and obliga-
tions is sufficient to obtain a given permission. E.g. if b is a system admin-
istrator and got the permission isSysAdmin(b) → mayRead(b, d) then b has
the permission to read document d: isSysAdmin(b), a says isSysAdmin(b)→
mayRead(b, d) to b `b mayRead(b, d). Using the derivation system, agents can
build a compliance proof, i.e. a formal deduction in the derivation system that
shows that an action was allowed by the policies. Compliance proofs can be
stored, communicated to the auditing authority and automatically checked.
Auditing
The auditing authority can ask users to justify actions that it observed. When
audited the user needs to provide a compliance proof for each of these actions.
The auditing process can be done effectively; the user should already have
built a proof before executing the action and the audit authority only needs
to check the correctness of the proof which is relatively straight forward.
Note that the auditing authority may actually consist of different entities
for the different companies; in this case an entity auditing one company relies
on the other entities to audit actions outside of its authority.
4.2 Implications
In the Audit Logic misuse is not prevented but deterred: auditing authorities
have a mandate of checking whether the data was used in compliance with
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the policies. Hence users should be auditable and sufficient audit trails should
be available to the auditors. This fits well with e.g. hospitals or companies,
where users can be held accountable for their actions and audit trails are
often already part of the (security) requirements. It may be hard to realize
these requirements in certain settings, such as large open networks (e.g. P2P).
Although this may be changing; for instance EU law demands that ISP’s keep
IP traffic records of all their users.
5 Related work
In this section we give an overview of the literature related to P3P, E-P3P
and the Audit Logic.
An extensive survey of social, legal and technical aspects of P3P was given
by Hochheiser [7]. In a more technical approach, Yu et al. [8] investigate the
semantics of P3P: they find several inconsistencies and show how to restrict
the language to avoid them. Byers et al. [3] survey the use of P3P on a
large number of websites. They argue that a large number of websites is not
compliant with the P3P specifications, and that this may yield legal problems
for these websites. The P3P Preference Language (APPEL) [21] was developed
by Cranor et al. to allow users to express preferences about P3P policies.
With APPEL, users can specify which P3P policies they find acceptable and
which not. Yu et al. [8] develop another kind of P3P preference language.
This approach is based on the semantics of P3P, unlike APPEL, which is
based on the syntax of P3P. Related to P3P is the Resource Description
Framework (RDF) [22]. RDF is developed to represent information on the
web in a machine-readable format. Although it is not specifically intended to
be used for privacy practices, it may be used to express P3P policies. The
RDF query language is considered to be an alternative approach to specifying
user preferences about P3P policies [21].
E-P3P is an extension of Jajodia et al.’s Flexible Authorization Frame-
work (FAF) [23]. Like in E-P3P, FAF provides a policy language that can
specify both positive and negative authorizations and uses hierarchies for ob-
jects and users. However, FAF does not allow the use of obligations, and does
not include a special construct to express the purpose of an access request.
The notion of privacy obligations in E-P3P is similar to the provisions in Ja-
jodia’s Provisional Authorization Specification Language (pASL) [24]. Here a
principal is granted access to an object if it causes certain conditions to be sat-
isfied. In E-P3P, obligations are treated opaquely, as methods that are called
and return a value, while in pASL obligations are treated more in detail by
using a temporal logic. E-P3P shares some similarities with XACML [25], an
OASIS standard for access control systems. XACML is XML-based and uses
object and data hierarchies, as well as conditions and obligations. XACML
is also inspired by FAF [23], and, although it is not specifically intended for
enterprise privacy policies, it can be used for protecting private data inside an
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enterprise. As an example of this a policy for the protection of medical records
is shown [25]. Although XACML does not have a special purpose construct,
like the one in E-P3P, it has been added in XACML’s so-called privacy profile.
Anderson [26] compares EPAL [12] and XACML and concludes that EPAL
corresponds mostly to a subset of XACML and that it lacks certain features
required for access control and privacy. Stufflebeam et al. [27] present a prac-
tical case study of E-P3P and P3P. Here the authors implement a number of
health care policies in both EPAL and P3P. Among other things, they con-
clude that many promises expressed in natural language privacy policies are
neither expressible in P3P nor enforceable with EPAL. More closely related to
the Audit Logic, Originator Control (ORCON) policies [28] were introduced as
an alternative for discretionary and mandatory policies. In mandatory access
control, the receiver of a document can not change the access rights on the
document, while in discretionary access control, the receiver of the document
can always change the rights on it. In ORCON policies, the original owner of
the data can always change the access rights on the data, while the current
owner of the data can not do so. This fits well with the privacy regulations in
which the subject should retain control over its personal data [1]. Also in the
Audit Logic, the owner of data can always change the rights on the data, how-
ever in the Audit Logic those rights are not stored centrally but can be moved
between systems in a completely distributed setting. The policy language of
the Audit Logic is based on a formal logics. Abadi [29] surveys a number of
different distributed access control models that are based on formal logics. In
these models an authorization request or an authentication credential corre-
sponds to a logical formula and its proof corresponds to the authorization or
authentication decision. For example, PCA [30] is a system for the authoriza-
tion of clients to webservers, by using distributed policies. The Audit Logic,
like PCA, uses the fact that checking proofs is easy and places the burden of
finding the proofs, which is typically harder, on the clients requesting access.
PCA however uses a higher order (classical) logic, while the Audit Logic is
restricted to first-order logic, rendering a more tractable proof search. A more
common example of systems where clients compile part or all of the autho-
rization proof is SDSI [31], which allows clients to ’chain’ together certificates
to prove their authenticity. The Audit Logic language is closely related to
Delegation Logic [32] and Binder [29]. They also use the says predicate intro-
duced by Abadi et al. [29], which however can not be nested inside another
says, for instance to express K says (M says P). This restriction is absent in
the Audit Logic. Also in the Audit Logic we use a refined form of the says
predicate, by specifying also the target agent. Conrado et al. [19] propose to
use DRM to enable privacy distributed systems and vice versa to use privacy
as a driver for a wider use of DRM. Licensescript is a novel DRM language
using Prolog code to encode more content licenses [18]. DRM however, unlike
the Audit Logic, requires the use of special hardware, which may make it hard
to implement in the enterprise’s legacy systems.
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6 Conclusions
We have analyzed three different privacy systems. We will now conclude with
their main advantages and shortcomings.
In the P3P system, privacy statements are formatted using XML and a
common vocabulary, to allow for automatic analysis of the statements. P3P
is well-established, in the sense that there are many popular websites that
use P3P [3]. Also there are a number of tools that generate natural language
statements from P3P statements [7]. A drawback of P3P is that it does not
distinguish between different types of access. For example, it is impossible to
specify that certain employees may update personal data, while others may
not. This makes it cumbersome to use for certain enterprise privacy policies.
The E-P3P system addresses this. E-P3P distinguishes between different
types of access and enables the use of obligations and conditions. Although E-
P3P itself is not an endorsed standard, it corresponds to a subset of an OASIS
standard, i.e. the XACML access control language [25]. In a way they are com-
plementary because E-P3P assumes the existence of access control policies,
independent of the privacy policies. E-P3P policies can contain prohibitions,
i.e. rules that deny access, which makes the language more expressive than
the language used in the Audit Logic. However it seems complicated to move
E-P3P policies from one enterprise to another. The new policy may cause con-
flicts and it may even be bypassed altogether due to other policies that are
incompatible [13]. Moving policies may be needed in enterprise collaborations
where private data is exchanged, guarded by policies. Furthermore, the use
of E-P3P can only give assurances to other enterprises, when they assume
that the enterprise is trusted to implement E-P3P correctly [5]. This may be
a too strong assumption in the setting where enterprises dynamically form
coalitions to exchange private data.
In the Audit Logic this assumption is relaxed. Here it is assumed that the
enterprise can misbehave, while compliance to privacy policies can be verified
by (external) auditors, through a formal auditing procedure. The Audit Logic
is designed for a distributed setting, and it is easy to move policies across
enterprise domains for instance accompanying private data. However, when
policies are sent from one enterprise to another, the question is raised wether
one can trust the sender of the policy. For example, a rogue enterprise could
be set up for the purpose of distributing false privacy policies to the other
enterprises. To solve this problem one could extend the Audit Logic with
a trust management system to facilitate trust decisions about the sources
of policies. Furthermore, it may be interesting to couple the reputation of
enterprises to the outcome of past audits, like in reputation-based systems [33].
Finally, the Audit Logic uses formal (first-order) logic to express policies and
lacks a tool that translates policies to natural language, like those for for P3P.
Such a translation to natural language is important to improve the useability
of policies based on formal logic [34].
14 M.A.C. Dekker, S. Etalle, and J. den Hartog
References
1. The European Parliament and Council: The data protection directive
(95/46/EC) (1995)
2. The European Parliament and Council: Directive on privacy and electronic
communications (2002/58/EC) (2002)
3. Byers, S., Cranor, L.F., Kormann, D.: Automated analysis of P3P-enabled
web sites. In: Proc. International Conference on Electronic Commerce (ICEC).
(2003) 326–338
4. Cranor, L., Langheinrich, M., Marchiori, M., Presler-Marshall, M., Reagle, J.:
The Platform for Privacy Preferences 1.0 (P3P 1.0) specification - W3C recom-
mendation 16 april 2002. http://w3.org/TR/P3P (2002)
5. Karjoth, G., Schunter, M., Waidner, M.: Platform for enterprise privacy prac-
tices: Privacy-enabled management of customer data. In Dingledine, R., Syver-
son, P.F., eds.: Proc. International Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technolo-
gies (PET). Lectures in Computer Science, Springer (2002) 69–84
6. Cederquist, J.G., Corin, R., Dekker, M.A.C., Etalle, S., den Hartog, J.I.: An au-
dit logic for accountability. In Winsborough, W., Sahai, A., eds.: Proc. Interna-
tional Workshop on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks (POLICY),
IEEE Computer Society Press (2005) 34–43
7. Hochheiser, H.: The platform for privacy preference as a social protocol: An
examination within the U.S. policy context. ACM Transactions on Internet
Technology (TOIT) 2(4) (2002) 276–306
8. Yu, T., Li, N., Anto´n, A.I.: A formal semantics for P3P. In: Proc. Workshop
On Secure Web Service (SWS), ACM Press (2004) 1–8
9. Schunter, M., Herreweghen, E.V., Waidner, M.: Expressive Privacy promises -
how to improve P3P. Position paper for W3C Workshop on the Future of P3P
(2002)
10. Cattlet, J.: Open letter to P3P developers. http://junkbusters.com/
standards.html (1999)
11. Ashley, P., Hada, S., Karjoth, G., Schunter, M.: E-P3P privacy policies and
privacy authorization. In Samarati, P., ed.: Proc. Workshop on Privacy in the
Electronic Society (WPES), ACM Press (2002) 103–109
12. Ashley, P., Hada, S., Karjoth, G., Schunter, M.: (Enterprise privacy authoriza-
tion language (EPAL 1.2) - W3C member submission 10 november 2003)
13. Backes, M., Pfitzmann, B., Schunter, M.: A toolkit for managing enterprise pri-
vacy policies. In Gollmann, D., Snekkenes, E., eds.: Proc. European Symposium
on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS), Springer (2003) 162–180
14. Karjoth, G., Schunter, M., Herreweghen, E.V.: Translating privacy practices into
privacy promises -how to promise what you can keep. In: Proc. International
Workshop on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks (POLICY), IEEE
Computer Society Press (2003) 135–146
15. Jajodia, S., Samarati, P., Subrahmanian, V.S., Bertino, E.: A unified framework
for enforcing multiple access control policies. In Peckham, J., ed.: Proc. Inter-
national Conference on Management of Data (SIGMOD), ACM Press (1997)
474–485
16. Park, J., Sandhu, R.: Towards usage control models: Beyond traditional access
control. In Bertino, E., ed.: Proc. Symposium on Access Control Models and
Technologies (SACMAT), ACM Press (2002) 57–64
Privacy in an Ambient World 15
17. Sandhu, R., Samarati, P.: Access control: Principles and practice. IEEE Com-
munications Magazine 32(9) (1994) 40–48
18. Chong, C.N., Corin, R., Etalle, S., Hartel, P.H., Jonker, W., Law, Y.W.: Li-
censeScript: A novel digital rights language and its semantics. In Ng, K., Busch,
C., Nesi, P., eds.: Proc. International Conference on Web Delivering of Music
(WEDELMUSIC), IEEE Computer Society Press (2003) 122–129
19. Conrado, C., Petkovic, M., van der Veen, M., van der Velde, W.: Controlled
sharing of personal content using digital rights management. In Ferna´ndez-
Medina, E., Herna´ndez, J.C., Garc´ıa, L.J., eds.: Proc. International Workshop
On Security in Information Systems (WOSIS). (2005) 173–185
20. Chong, C.N., Peng, Z., Hartel, P.H.: Secure audit logging with tamper-resistant
hardware. In Gritzalis, D., di Vimercati, S.D.C., Samarati, P., Katsikas, S.K.,
eds.: IFIP International Conference on Information Security and Privacy in the
Age of Uncertainty (SEC), Springer (2003) 73–84
21. Cranor, L., Langheinrich, M., Marchiori, M.: A P3P preference exchange lan-
guage 1.0 (APPEL 1.0) (2002)
22. Lassila, O., Swick, R.R.: Resource Description Framework (RDF) Model and
Syntax Specification - W3C Recommendation 22 February 1999 (2002)
23. Jajodia, S., Samarati, P., Sapino, M.L., Subrahmanian, V.S.: Flexible support
for multiple access control policies. ACM Transactions on Database Systems
26(2) (2001) 214–260
24. Jajodia, S., Kudo, M., Subrahmanian, S.: Provisional authorization. (In: Proc.
1st International Workshop on Security and Privacy in E-Commerce (WSPEC))
25. OASIS Access Control TC: eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
(XACML) Version 2.0 - Oasis Standard, 1 Feb 2005 (2005)
26. Anderson, A.: Comparison of two privacy languages: EPAL and XACML. Sun
Technical Report TR-2005-147 (2005)
27. Stufflebeam, W.H., Anto´n, A.I., He, Q., Jain, N.: Specifying privacy policies
with P3P and EPAL: lessons learned. In: Proc. Workshop on Privacy in the
Electronic Society (WPES). (2004) 35
28. Park, J., Sandhu, R.: Originator control in usage control. In: Proc. Interna-
tional Workshop on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks (POLICY),
Washington, DC, USA, IEEE Computer Society (2002) 60
29. Abadi, M.: Logic in access control. In Kolaitis, P.G., ed.: Proc. Symposium
on Logic in Computer Science (LICS), IEEE Computer Society Press (2003)
228–233
30. Appel, A.W., Felten, E.W.: Proof-carrying authentication. In Tsudik, G., ed.:
Proc. Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), ACM
Press (1999) 52–62
31. Rivest, R.L., Lampson, B.: SDSI – A simple distributed security infrastructure.
Presented at CRYPTO’96 Rumpsession (1996)
32. Li, N., Grosof, B.N., Feigenbaum, J.: Delegation logic: A logic-based approach
to distributed authorization. ACM Transactions on Information and System
Security (TISSEC) 6(1) (2003) 128–171
33. Shmatikov, V., Talcott, C.L.: Reputation-based trust management. Journal of
Computer Security 13(1) (2005) 167–190
34. Halpern, J.Y., Weissman, V.: Using first-order logic to reason about policies.
In Focardi, R., ed.: Proc. Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW),
IEEE Computer Society Press (2003) 187–201
